The problem can be resolved if the idea that the relations between the theories are properly captured by implication is given up. I propose that they be understood in terms of (Carnap's) procedure of explication. After some preliminary conceptualization of explication, the relations between the theories are rendered intelligible. In particular, the puzzle about knowledge relies on the nontransitivity of explication.

The reason why the reconstruction of the explicatory relations between the theories is not obvious is due to a dramatic device employed. Socrates first misleads Theaetetus about the relation between the theories (making it sound as if the transitions between them were of simple deductive nature), in order to be able to address the problem explicitly later (in the Defense of Protagoras). For Socrates' ultimate aim in the first section of the dialogue is to teach Theaetetus an ethic of philosophical authorship and criticism, which relies on the conceptual framework of explication. In this light, Socrates' notorious negative response to the apparently good arguments presented at [163a-164b] becomes clearer.

This is a very short paper applying a little bit of an Aristotelian apparatus (from de Anima) to show some space for understanding the phenomenon of afterimages. For Aristotle, perception consists in the transfer of form from the perceived object to the sense-organ. The sense-organ judges the intensity of the perceived quality by contrast with the intensity of its own form. Thus, Aristotle mentions two conditions a sense-organ must satisfy in order for it to allow perception: the organ must be capable of adopting the (alien) form of the object perceived and the form of the organ must be an intermediate between two extremes of a sensible quality (in order for the organ to judge the extremes as such). Implicit here is yet a third condition. In order for perception to register objective changes, the sense-organ must compare the alien forms with one privileged form (its own). But for this to be possible the process of perceiving must be thought of as involving two stages: imaging -- the acquiring of the alien form by the sense-organ, and counter-imaging -- the returning to the normal form of organ. The latter process plays a crucial role in explaining both the positive and the negative after-images.

The paper appeared in Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 28 (1992), 163-177.

I presented a version of the paper at the Seventh Annual Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Discipuli, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, March 22-23, 1991.

The paper appeared in: (eds.) L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki, Social Systems, Rationality and Revolution (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 83-104.

In his theory of punishment, Hobbes commits himself to an apparent contradiction. On one hand, he holds that we authorize our own punishments (even our own death), in which case we would seem to have thereby obligated ourselves not to resist the execution of the punishment. On the other hand, however, Hobbes insists that we have the right to resist for "…no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment…" (Leviathan Ch. 14, p. 69). As Hobbes repeatedly makes both claims, he appears to be committed to a straightforward contradiction.

In his insightful discussion of Hobbes' account of punishment, David Gauthier argues that Leviathan contains two separate (and mutually inconsistent) theories of punishment: the authorization theory, which centers around the first horn of the contradiction, and the right of nature theory, at the heart of which lies the second one. Although Gauthier thinks that the right of nature account is more Hobbesian than the authorization theory, he attempts to reconcile the two accounts. I argue that the reconciliation fails. I explore the alternative strategy where preference is given to the authorization account. I argue that Hobbes has resources which allow one to understand how he could be committed to an authorization theory of punishment and yet allow that, in cases of extreme forms of punishment, the convict has the right to resist the infliction of the evil. I do not argue that the position on which we can make sense of Hobbes' claims is actually the position Hobbes adopts. Rather, my aim is to see whether there is a way of reconciling the authorization theory of punishment with Hobbes' insistence that we have the right to resist.

I presented a version of the paper at the Annual Graduate Student Conference, Washington University, St. Louis, October 23-25, 1992.